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04:49:13  <jjjohnny>pfraze: its gonna be interesting, if relays are generic, an app will get data from other apps used by the same key
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05:01:15  <pfraze>jjjohnny: yeah. Everybody shares the log
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12:47:19  <substack>juliangruber: sorry about closing that issue, didn't read closely enough
12:47:32  <substack>juliangruber: also, would it make sense to have a function form for properties?
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13:07:17  <domanic>nathan7, where did you get to with the bash otp thing? I need it for wifi.sh
13:09:14  <nathan7>domanic: I think that's mostly in the concept stage
13:09:42  <nathan7>domanic: there were cooler things to work on, sorry q=
13:10:00  <nathan7>domanic: by the way, I've been thinking about using the BLAKE2 tree mode
13:10:02  <domanic>here is my use case: I need to run wpa_supplicant, and ping and parse their output
13:10:33  <domanic>nathan7, can I use BLAKE2 treemode like this: https://github.com/dominictarr/tree-exchange
13:10:45  <nathan7>domanic: so the BLAKE2 tree mode keys the hash on the block index
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13:11:18  <nathan7>domanic: I don't think we want that, we want maximum sharing of blocks, right?
13:11:21  <domanic>I want to grab a block somewhere in the middle, and then also give the "uncle" hashes needed to prove that the block is indeed part of the file
13:11:50  <nathan7>that works, yes
13:11:52  <domanic>what do you mean "maximum sharing of blocks?"
13:12:47  <nathan7>basically, with BLAKE2's own tree mode, hash(blocks[0], 0) != hash(blocks[3], 3) even if block 0 and 3 are the same
13:13:01  <nathan7>because they're keyed by their index too
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13:17:15  <domanic>nathan7, wait are you saying we want that or not?
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13:22:00  <nathan7>domanic: I'm not sure
13:22:17  <nathan7>domanic: having blocks in the system twice just because they were in different spots in the tree seems kinda silly
13:22:47  <nathan7>domanic: it's basically intended to deter length-extension
13:23:42  <nathan7>domanic: like, it uses the tree-hashing thing internally anyway, if you do it manually you get to have the intermediate hash values
13:23:42  <domanic>so in ssb that will never happen anyway, because every block has a pointer to the previous block anyway
13:24:14  <nathan7>what does that have to do with anything?
13:24:51  <domanic>well, it has to do with the problems that I want to solve with tree hashes
13:24:54  <nathan7>like, blake2(x) returns the top-level value of the tree, if you chop x up yourself and drive the tree-handling yourself you get to see the intermediate values
13:25:08  <nathan7>with the same top-level result
13:25:55  <domanic>what is a concrete case where you expect to have blocks reoccur
13:26:12  <nathan7>our VCS swarm thing
13:26:17  <domanic>VCS?
13:26:21  <nathan7>you modify one character in a large file
13:26:28  <nathan7>like, git and stuff
13:26:44  <domanic>if you modify one character, then the indexes wont change
13:26:48  <nathan7>true
13:27:00  <domanic>if you insert a char, then all the hashes break anyway
13:27:07  <domanic>s/break/change
13:27:09  <nathan7>mhm
13:27:17  <nathan7>I'm curious how we can implement deltas for that
13:27:44  <domanic>there are ways, but that isn't blake2 anymore
13:27:50  <nathan7>yep
13:28:51  <nathan7>you basicaly tell the other node, "if you take x, which has this hash, and apply these changes, you'll have y, which has the hash you asked for"
13:29:00  <nathan7>*basically
13:29:52  <domanic>sure.
13:30:03  <domanic>are you familiar with the git packfile format?
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13:30:23  <nathan7>I've been researching it yesterday
13:30:49  <domanic>and do you think you can improve on it, or would just basically using something similar be fine?
13:31:16  <substack>hij1nx: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2VYw3cnfDoU
13:31:45  <domanic>A good thing about how git uses snapshots is that you can recreate the state without having to have the entire history
13:31:51  <nathan7>domanic: I'd like to do something similar, yeah
13:32:04  <nathan7>yes, I intend to use the git model regarding that
13:32:40  <domanic>it gives you a nice simple abstraction, and then has optimizations behind that
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13:34:15  <nathan7>yep
13:34:29  <nathan7>that's what I'm generally after, solid, cryptographically sound abstraction
13:34:42  <nathan7>and then find optimisations to make it faster without breaking the guarantees
13:38:20  <domanic>SQL also has a pattern like that, the abstraction is a full table scan, or a cartesian join, which is then filtered (by where, join, clauses) but that is just an optimization
13:38:34  <domanic>doing a full scan everytime will still return the correct result
13:39:19  <nathan7>yep
13:39:32  <nathan7>I've been doing gossipdb-level like that
13:39:49  <nathan7>first build the simplest thing that works, then make it fast
13:41:12  <nathan7>domanic: what was the blake2 impl you were using?
13:41:33  <domanic>http://npm.im/blake2s
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13:42:56  <domanic>nathan7, one thing I am thinking about with ssb is to have each message point not just to the previous message, but to the tops of the preceding tree
13:43:28  <domanic>say 8th message points to tree of first 4 hashes, and tree of 5+6 and 7
13:43:55  <nathan7>what does this add?
13:44:08  <domanic>well this means that you can verify any subset of the log
13:44:08  <nathan7>just faster traversal?
13:44:24  <juliangruber>substack you mean like body: function(el){ // do stuff with el? }
13:45:03  <domanic>whereas if you have a singly linked list, then you need to have the entire chain to verify each that each message is actually inside the chain
13:45:17  <nathan7>could keep local indexes
13:45:23  <nathan7>also related thing I was thinking about before you said that, for blob merkle trees, I'm curious what the optimal tree shape is
13:46:05  <domanic>nathan7, basically I want to be able to request a few portions of your feed, and validate they are all the same thing
13:46:15  <domanic>all part of the same log
13:46:19  <nathan7>mhm
13:46:26  <nathan7>basically a skip list?
13:46:40  <domanic>yeah, that is another way to look at it
13:46:48  <domanic>oh yes, this is a skip list
13:47:11  <nathan7>[=
13:47:31  <substack>juliangruber: function (value) { return value += ' active' } would be append: ' active'
13:47:35  <nathan7>also, we should think about how protocol extensions work
13:47:40  <domanic>this would allow ssb to scale out much better
13:47:49  <substack>but anyways it's not use adding it until it's needed
13:47:53  <substack>* no use
13:48:03  <domanic>you could replicate all your friends, but sometimes you might want some messages from foaf
13:48:39  <nathan7>are there any attacks where the skip list is exploitable though
13:48:55  <nathan7>like, what if the skip list lies
13:49:05  <domanic>that wouldn't validate
13:49:23  <juliangruber>substack: yeah i think that'd be useful, but you're right
13:49:29  <nathan7>it wouldn't validate to people with the whole chain, no
13:49:36  <nathan7>you could probably mess with the internals of other people's ssb if you manage to do that though
13:49:50  <domanic>like say alice "retweets" bob, and then later carol "retweets" a different message from bob
13:50:17  <domanic>with a tree you could validate these where both from the same feed with just a few hashes, not needing the entire history
13:51:26  <domanic>if you have links from other feeds into a feed, it prevents someone from stealing a key and forging old messages
13:51:55  <domanic>... instead of trusting the longest chain, trust the most linked to chain
13:52:12  <nathan7>both are cheap though
13:52:23  <domanic>nathan7, linking?
13:52:25  <nathan7>yeah
13:52:42  <domanic>ah, but not if you have potentially thousands of chains
13:53:05  <nathan7>have a friend collude with you
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13:53:14  <domanic>like, you might have 150 friends but thousands of foaf
13:53:24  <nathan7>hmm
13:53:38  <nathan7>we really are making "the internet does not forget" a law, aren't we
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13:53:59  <domanic>yes.
13:54:07  <nathan7>I wonder if that's a good thing.
13:54:42  <domanic>well, what is the alternative?
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13:55:18  <nathan7>an internet that forgets is an internet that can be forced to forget
13:55:31  <nathan7>well, actually
13:56:04  <domanic>anyway, ssb is pseudonymous and you can always generate a new key pair
13:56:30  <nathan7>mhm
13:56:48  <nathan7>you could post a key transition message
13:57:06  <nathan7>which is a message pointing forward in time, essentially
13:57:35  <nathan7>and you could choose not to link back to your old chain
13:57:47  <nathan7>and that process could even be automated, as to rotate your keys regularly
13:58:00  <nathan7>kind of like how OTR does it
13:58:17  <nathan7>!
13:58:37  <nathan7>domanic: You could actually *release* your keys a while after that
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13:58:53  <domanic>nathan7, I'm not trying to solve ALL the problems. I'm trying to build a ladder that allows us climb higher and build a new layer
13:59:28  <nathan7>domanic: so, like, every year, you release your n-2th key, you switch your n-1th key over to your nth
13:59:33  <domanic>so the goal is to have security, privacy is another problem
13:59:41  <domanic>nathan7, yeah that would work
13:59:54  <nathan7>you have now gained plausible deniability for everything you said >2 years ago
14:00:37  <domanic>yeah, you could probably do that
14:01:05  <nathan7>anyone who has been monitoring you of course does know for sure you said those things
14:01:07  <domanic>but don't reveal the key that any private messages where encrypted to
14:01:10  <nathan7>but it's not usable as evidence
14:01:21  <nathan7>*only* release signing keys
14:01:36  <nathan7>the goal is to invalidate evidence, by making it trivially reproducible
14:02:05  <domanic>I think there are probably better approaches if you want privacy though
14:02:40  <nathan7>well, the only kind of privacy for the past is plausible deniability
14:03:34  <domanic>I don't think this is that simple
14:04:00  <nathan7>if you've said something, and there's a record of it, the best you can do is make the record useless as proof
14:04:17  <domanic>because if other people have signed messages that contain hashes of your old messages...
14:04:43  <domanic>then that proves your messages to be older than those messages
14:04:55  <nathan7>yes, everyone would have to rotate their keys in this scheme
14:05:45  <domanic>and at the same time?
14:05:50  <nathan7>not necessarily
14:06:25  <nathan7>I have to work out how quickly all proof disappears though
14:06:48  * toddselfquit
14:06:50  <nathan7>yes, that might be necessary :|
14:07:06  <domanic>it seems non-simple at least
14:07:08  <nathan7>yes
14:07:26  <nathan7>the key is that this is an add-on
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14:08:23  <domanic>you could certainly use many ephemeral identities, there is nothing stopping that.
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14:09:20  <domanic>similar to the way people increase anonymity by continually generating new btc addresses
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14:10:01  <nathan7>like, the key to OTR is that you tell everyone you're switching, and then invalidate the old identity
14:11:02  <nathan7>anyone who is observing in between you announcing the switch (which may be encrypted and unobservable to other people) and you announcing your old private key is certain that you're still the same person
14:11:18  <nathan7>after your old private keys are announced, nobody can prove the authenticity of old messages
14:11:34  <nathan7>unless they have a timestamp you trust
14:11:49  <nathan7>and the chain-linking provides distributed timestamping, thwarting this
14:12:22  <domanic>OTR has a different goal to ssb
14:12:24  <nathan7>yes
14:12:41  <nathan7>basically, if all your friends vow to forget, then it is forgotten
14:13:04  <nathan7>ah
14:13:07  <domanic>a social network is about sharing with many, which is inherently less private (duh) than a one-on-one
14:13:18  <nathan7>but you're also making their chain links weaker
14:13:27  <nathan7>well, uselss
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14:13:29  <nathan7>*useless
14:13:55  <nathan7>and you could refuse to link to their chain as long as they don't switch
14:14:00  <nathan7>giving them an incentive to forget
14:14:19  <domanic>yeah, that would work
14:14:39  <nathan7>you'd have to disincentivise doing this very frequently
14:14:55  <nathan7>and of course we'd have to build some easy-to-use message forging tools
14:15:11  <nathan7>(OTR comes with OTR message forging tools)
14:15:38  <domanic>there are many cases where I want an internet that doesn't forget
14:15:49  <nathan7>mhm
14:15:55  <domanic>like, I don't want people to forget abotu the modules that I have published
14:16:00  <nathan7>yep
14:16:09  <nathan7>the forgetting is per-identity though
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14:16:36  <domanic>yeah. personal conversations are different though
14:16:48  <nathan7>so module-dominic would be persistent
14:17:09  <nathan7>a single chain, unbroken
14:17:20  <nathan7>but for personal communications, you break the chain every once in a while
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14:17:42  <domanic>or just encrypt those messages, or use OTR
14:17:56  <nathan7>yes
14:18:04  <nathan7>but my twitter has personal stuff too
14:18:19  <nathan7>back from when my twitter followers were a very different group of people
14:18:52  <domanic>yes, and political statements that you may want forgotten in some possible futures
14:19:14  <nathan7>yep
14:19:57  <nathan7>you could publish entire alternative timelines that cannot be proven or disproven
14:19:59  <domanic>So, I'm we are also gonna have ephemeral messages which arn't linked to the other messages, or persisted
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14:20:47  <domanic>but also, since only your friends tend to have your feed, it will be a bit harder to get hold of your feed than with twitter/fb
14:20:55  <nathan7>yep
14:21:03  <nathan7>like, if everyone cooperates, forgetting the past is easy
14:21:11  <domanic>but even without that
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14:21:27  <domanic>it's much easier to send a threatening letter to a corp
14:21:48  <nathan7>so you could simply announce the old private keys once all your friends commit to forgetting
14:22:13  <nathan7>and if your friends are really nice, they'll delete the messages too
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14:22:41  <domanic>if it's decentralized, and pseudonymous, just figuring out who to threaten is a lot more difficult
14:22:46  <nathan7>yep
14:22:57  <nathan7>I'm just looking to strengthen that
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14:23:10  <nathan7>you could threaten someone's friends, but even they don't have useful proof anymore
14:23:27  <domanic>and, you'd have to actively connect to the network to surveil it (or hack devices of a peer ;/
14:24:13  <domanic>if you have to find and threaten individuals it's and order of magnitude more expensive to surveil
14:24:29  <nathan7>if you destroy the trustworthiness of the past signatures, their proof is no better than hearsay
14:24:49  <nathan7>activists will always be pursued individually
14:24:56  <domanic>yes
14:25:09  <domanic>but I'm not trying to build something for activists
14:25:13  <nathan7>sure
14:25:19  <domanic>I'm trying to build something for everyone
14:25:28  <domanic>okay, so the other problem
14:25:31  <nathan7>everyone has things they want forgotten
14:25:47  <nathan7>I think we should build this once we have the system that doesn't forget
14:25:52  <nathan7>forgetting is a feature that can be added
14:26:05  <nathan7>we can incentivise it and everything
14:26:20  <nathan7>domanic: go ahead
14:26:22  <domanic>if you keys get stolen, but before everyone has agreed to forget, can we tell?
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14:28:25  <nathan7>if everyone has received your chain termination / key switch, then stealing the keys is equivalent to announcing them
14:28:55  <nathan7>if someone hasn't received your chain termination, you're as screwed as you'd already be
14:29:19  <nathan7>announcing your keys is basically intentional key theft
14:30:39  <nathan7>basically, the chain termination reduces the damage of key theft to 0 once everyone has received it
14:32:09  <nathan7>and then you simulate key theft intentionally, to make your old signatures worthless
14:32:25  <substack>forgetting is akin to forcing other computers to do something for you
14:32:39  <substack>not to mention forcing people to forget that a message was sent
14:32:42  <substack>that seems impossible
14:33:08  <nathan7>well, you're making past signature meaningless, substack
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14:33:28  <nathan7>it's basically "you had to be there, man"
14:33:42  <nathan7>if you were there to observe it, you have proof that it happened
14:33:59  <nathan7>however, your proof isn't transferable — they'd have to trust your timestamp
14:34:30  <nathan7>if the past can be forged, then only those who were there to observe it have proof
14:34:43  <nathan7>but their proof is non-transferable because they could forge it just as easily
14:36:20  <substack>the ability to forge messages doesn't seem like a very strong form of deniability
14:36:29  <nathan7>it's the strongest possible, substack
14:36:55  <substack>because now the onus is on the accused to explain away those messages
14:37:09  <nathan7>the accuser can forge any message, however
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14:38:10  <nathan7>the accuser can generate an alternative history with new messages inserted at arbitrary points
14:38:18  <nathan7>as can anyone else
14:39:06  <nathan7>if anyone could accuse you of anything, the accusations are fairly pointless
14:39:20  <nathan7>and anyone can produce an alternative history in which you didn't say that thing
14:39:38  <nathan7>so now your evidence is hearsay at best
14:40:24  <nathan7>like, evidence is only evidence if you can't just make it up
14:40:43  <nathan7>if you can make it up, why would your evidence be more correct than the evidence I just made up
14:40:57  <substack>but that's how evidence currently works
14:41:01  <substack>in computing
14:41:15  <substack>a sysadmin could modify log files to say whatever they wanted
14:41:19  <nathan7>yep
14:41:27  <nathan7>I'm trying to *retain* those properties
14:41:36  <substack>but presently that hardly ever happens
14:41:40  <nathan7>I can't make them any stronger
14:41:49  <nathan7>well, I use OTR for personal communications
14:41:53  <substack>it's still very strong evidence even though somebody could tamper with them
14:41:59  <substack>just like people can lie under oath
14:42:05  <nathan7>yes, in this case only the sysadmin can tamper with them
14:42:21  <nathan7>you spread the keys so that anyone who has the evidence also has the tools to tamper with it
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14:43:31  <substack>if you have 3 versions of a story and 2 match up, the 3rd one is probably tampered with
14:43:55  <nathan7>you can produce an arbitrary amount of versions, though
14:44:09  <substack>just because somebody could doesn't mean that they would
14:44:23  <nathan7>that doesn't really hold up in a court of law
14:44:42  <nathan7>like, what you're saying is that once you drop stringent requirements on evidence, you can prove anything
14:45:01  <substack>I really don't think that is usually the case
14:45:20  <substack>law is composed of human decisions that weigh many factors to determine the most likely outcomes
14:45:52  <nathan7>if you can readily produce evidence for any given version of the story, what value does that evidence have
14:46:08  <substack>plenty!
14:46:24  <substack>evidence is highly contextual
14:46:51  <domanic>nathan7, I mean, if you use some crypto system to plan a bank robbery and it's used against you that is one thing...
14:47:07  <nathan7>I can produce evidence that you said x and didn't say y, and I can produce evidence that you said y and didn't say x
14:47:14  <nathan7>domanic: you have more useful evidence there though
14:47:28  <domanic>if you are a political prisoner, no amount of crypto can protect you from a show trial
14:47:31  <nathan7>correct
14:47:37  <nathan7>that's substack's argument basically
14:48:04  <nathan7>in a show trial, where evidence is picked at will, the validity of evidence is irrelevant
14:48:12  <domanic>yeah
14:48:47  <nathan7>if the validity of evidence matters, however, your evidence featuring the tools to forge it makes a significant difference
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14:49:42  <nathan7>for the show trial, the cryptographic sign matters little, they can already claim anything they want and the court will accept it
14:51:16  <nathan7>if you're being prosecuted for discussing something odd and the FBI or NSA could've made up all the evidence, then it's going to be a hard case
14:52:32  <nathan7>this only works if the evidence is acquired after-the-fact of course, active surveillance is still a threat
14:52:40  <nathan7>because FBI/NSA timestamps are trusted by the courts
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14:57:55  <domanic>nathan7, this wifi is weird, what was last chat you got from me?
14:58:09  <nathan7>domanic: http://sprunge.us/JTKO
14:58:16  <nathan7>domanic: I can't prove that history of course
14:59:28  <domanic>yup, irc has failed
14:59:31  <nathan7>so you'll have to take my word for it, and the sprunge server's word for it, along with every router along the way including the dodgy wifi
15:00:09  <domanic>I don't think we can prevent that, but can we give people a new way to decentrally organize them selves?
15:00:09  <domanic>i.e. create a new and better way to settle disputes and make decisions collectively
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15:12:23  <domanic>http://www.csoonline.com/article/2687265/application-security/remote-exploit-in-bash-cve-2014-6271.html
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15:20:22  <nathan7>GitHub has AcceptEnv off I figure
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15:35:35  <jjjohnny>nathan7, domanic, you will be able to post ephemeral messsages by not including them in the w/e data ends up in yr butt
15:36:18  <nathan7>jjjohnny: do I know you by any other name?
15:36:19  <jjjohnny>that is, your message is a link to an ephemeral message
15:36:36  <jjjohnny>nathan7: if u do, that would be dangerous
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15:37:05  <domanic>jjjohnny, you probably havn't met nathan he's on another continent
15:37:19  <nathan7>domanic: what's Micheil's nick?
15:37:41  <nathan7>I was too drunk at the time to remember what it was
15:38:20  <domanic>this micheil? https://twitter.com/michielbdejong
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15:39:55  <nathan7>domanic: no, @miksago
15:40:32  <domanic>on irc? not sure
15:41:49  <nathan7>he said he lurked in #stackvm sometimes
15:42:00  <nathan7>I thought his nick had a bunch of j's
15:43:28  <domanic>oh
15:49:03  <jjjohnny>thats me
15:49:13  * jjjohnnyhas a buncha j
15:49:32  <jjjohnny>im the one true 3 j
15:51:42  <nathan7>ah
15:51:46  <nathan7>okay
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15:56:20  <domanic>pfraze, yo
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16:00:51  <pfraze>domanic, yo
16:01:07  <domanic>pfraze, I'm looking at the eco stuff
16:01:46  <domanic>this looks good, except I think it's utility will be greatly improved by causal ordering with very little overhead in the protocol
16:02:10  <domanic>(although, it may make the code a little more complex)
16:02:30  <pfraze>what do you think we can add with it?
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16:05:44  <domanic>well, it means apps can know whether an update was concurrent
16:05:54  <pfraze>there's the peter bailis research on transactions to look at; I seem to remember that just needed causal dependency
16:06:06  <domanic>which could mean ask the user "does this look right?"
16:06:09  <nathan7>jjjohnny: wait, you're @miksago or not?
16:06:34  <domanic>nathan7, no he's jjjohnny
16:06:43  <domanic>pfraze, hang on, gtg, talk later
16:06:47  <pfraze>ok
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16:09:48  <pfraze>domanic, for when you get back: that's a good point; eco already detects concurrency, but not in a way that's easy for the application to analyze
16:10:02  <pfraze>even moreso now that the vector clocks have been removed
16:10:54  <pfraze>causal links would make the (branching) history trivial to recreate, which we'll definitely want
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16:21:28  <nathan7>todo: make a serviceworker than uses webtorrent
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17:23:59  <jesusabdullah>substack: didn't you have a terminal muxing library? github search sucks
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17:52:35  <kessler-m>Substaxk
17:52:48  <kessler-m>Substack: ping
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18:21:34  <mikolalysenko_>this is really cool: http://lwn.net/SubscriberLink/612021/92c8ccb5b82d4d90/
18:21:44  <mikolalysenko_>relevant paper: https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/atc11/tech/final_files/Triplett.pdf
18:21:59  <mikolalysenko_>pfraze, domanic: ^^ might be relevant to your work with crdts even
18:23:16  <pfraze>mikolalysenko_, thanks, added to my tabs
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19:27:47  <chapel>trevnorris: https://github.com/v8/v8/blob/master/src/hydrogen.cc#L4256
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20:22:53  <gorhgorh>@domanic @mmalecki @nathan7 http://test.squatconf.eu is now up in the last version, please make a last check before launch
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20:38:46  <trevnorris>chapel: okay, i'm completely out of context.
20:39:22  <chapel>:P
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20:39:55  <chapel>I'm sure you know that generators bail out in v8 optimizer
20:39:59  <chapel>thats just the code for it
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20:46:54  <trevnorris>chapel: heh, thanks. :)
20:47:36  <chapel>was brought up on our slack in reply to the chicago strongloop meetup about express, generators and what not
20:47:36  <chapel>:P
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20:55:12  <nathan7>gorhgorh: lgtm [=
20:55:39  <nathan7>domanic_: http://test.squatconf.eu can I get a +1 from you?
20:56:34  <gorhgorh>cool let's wait for a second one and go :)
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21:03:49  <domanic_> nathan7 gorhgorh +1
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21:04:17  <gorhgorh>\o/
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21:41:32  <gorhgorh>\o/ http://squatconf.eu
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21:52:59  <joates>^^ looks great gorhgorh !!
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22:27:36  <nathan7>gorhgorh: I'm still seeing the old text
22:27:55  <nathan7>gorhgorh: ah, cache
22:27:58  <nathan7>gorhgorh: also SHIT I made a spelling mistake
22:28:30  <gorhgorh>hu huh hu
22:28:41  <nathan7>fix pushed
22:29:00  <nathan7>https://github.com/squatconf/manifest/commit/c9f0149ed012cfc06a1e0b30636a417358ac620d
22:30:11  <nathan7>also, I forgot that the stuff in the "How is this possible?" section would go on one line
22:30:19  <nathan7>so it has funny-looking capital letters where they don't belong
22:30:33  * nathan7pushes another fix
22:31:37  <nathan7>derp, laptop is out of battery
22:33:14  <gorhgorh>pulled
22:33:32  <gorhgorh>and clear cache the one line H2 problem is gone now
22:33:49  <nathan7>[=
22:35:52  <gorhgorh>@nathan7 mhh, it seem you did not pushed the commits :p
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22:40:02  <nathan7>gorhgorh: I pushed two
22:40:25  <gorhgorh>https://github.com/squatconf/website/commits/master
22:40:28  <nathan7>gorhgorh: at least one made it to GitHub before my battery died
22:40:32  <gorhgorh>do you see them here ?
22:41:04  <nathan7>I pushed to manifest
22:41:12  <gorhgorh>ahhh opps sorry
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22:42:37  <joates>open discussion: who wants to attend SqautConf Paris 2014 ?
22:42:56  <joates>|o me
22:43:28  <gorhgorh>at this stage i would rather even say make it happend :p
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22:43:53  <joates>i can't even spell it LOL
22:45:15  <joates>it has to happen gorhgorh, because after the 1st one i think/hope others will "pop-up", like in London, Berlin, Madrid etc
22:46:03  <joates>it will/could start a chain reaction of low-cost, disruptive tech themed events
22:49:24  <gorhgorh>iwould also love to use this event to link our software world with the hardware scene that already have connection to suats
22:49:32  <gorhgorh>squats
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22:52:00  <jjjohnny>what about pluots?
22:56:34  <nathan7>also, does anyone know if Jeremy hangs out on IRC? domanic_?
23:00:11  <domanic_>jez0990, < this jeremy?
23:06:46  <joates>gorhgorh, the squat venue is about �200 ? is that for the weekend ? we can do whatever we want in that space for 48 hours, or how does that work ?
23:07:31  <gorhgorh>200 ? nope more 100 and for now it is 24
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23:11:42  <joates>ok and it can fit about 50 people ?
23:11:59  <joates>so that's �2 each :D
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23:13:03  <joates>gorhgorh, thats an awesome deal for a tech conference venue !!
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23:15:25  <gorhgorh>@domanic_ what do you plan to talk about ?
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23:16:37  <gorhgorh>@nathan7 too, it could be cool to see where the talks are heading to
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23:20:26  <nathan7>domanic_: the one working on Winternitz sigs
23:21:36  <nathan7>gorhgorh: I intend to talk about the future of manufacturing and distribution of machine-readable object descriptions for manufacturing
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23:22:43  <nathan7>domanic_: also, a thing I realised: switching keys is going to be a frequent thing *anyway* with purely hash-based signatures (Lamport, Winternitz, etc)
23:23:32  <domanic_>nathan7, correct
23:23:44  <domanic_>I have also been thinking about this more...
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23:24:29  <domanic_>prehaps what would work well for this need is to use ssb to bootstrap an ephemeral network in parallel
23:25:08  <nathan7>no, I'd want my regular twitter feed forgotten regularly
23:26:14  <substack>you could have a rolling variant of OTR where keys are valid for windows of time
23:26:35  <nathan7>what's the difference here?
23:26:47  <substack>but you still need to trust your recipients to delete the keys afterward, which is the same problem
23:26:57  <nathan7>no, you don't
23:27:16  <nathan7>you now have to take their word for it that that was the real history
23:32:20  <domanic_>nathan7, ssb isn't necessarily twitter, it's just a twitter-like datamodel
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23:39:59  <nathan7>domanic_: sure
23:40:15  <nathan7>domanic_: but for practically every social application I want it to forget
23:41:40  <domanic_>nathan7, then why do you use twitter?
23:42:31  <nathan7>domanic_: because it's the best we have right now?
23:42:37  <nathan7>domanic_: why do *you* use twitter?
23:42:51  <nathan7>domanic_: why does anyone use twitter?
23:43:06  <nathan7>domanic_: it's not like it has the best properties a system like that could have
23:43:59  <domanic_>nathan7, I think the best property something can have is is simplicity
23:44:17  * oldskirtquit (Ping timeout: 260 seconds)
23:44:20  <domanic_>be what it is, and be that thing well
23:45:07  <nathan7>mhm
23:45:46  <domanic_>you are talking about taking a system designed to replicate data reliably and add another layer to make it unreliable
23:45:50  <nathan7>invalidating past signatures is a thing I can do with or without cooperation from others
23:46:12  <nathan7>I can simply append a message to my chain that includes my private key
23:46:33  <nathan7>and key compromise happens anyway
23:47:00  <nathan7>so plausible deniability can be readily implemented without other clients cooperating
23:47:30  <domanic_>but it needs to be plausable that someone else could have made those messages at that time
23:47:42  <nathan7>sure, build tools to forge messages
23:48:10  <domanic_>but they need to be able to forge those message before you announce the key
23:48:14  <nathan7>I want to have a point-and-click history editor to allow you to produce arbitrary histories when a key has been compromised
23:48:37  <nathan7>why?
23:49:08  <nathan7>like, reducing chain cross-linking requires cooperation from others, but you can provide them with incentives
23:49:56  <nathan7>because increasing the cross-linking to their chain is good for them
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23:58:17  <nathan7>domanic_: so the speed difference between the 32-bit and 64-bit versions of BLAKE2
23:58:47  <nathan7>domanic_: the 32-bit one is twice as fast on 32-bit CPUs, the 64-bit one is 1.5 times as fast on 64-bit CPUs
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23:59:10  <nathan7>domanic_: and then there's the -p versions, which parallelise the hashing using SIMD
23:59:26  <domanic_>nathan7, find me a 64 bit blake2 that is fast in javascript
23:59:44  <nathan7>domanic_: I don't think one is around yet
23:59:51  <domanic_>yeah me neither